When attackers breach a network today, the production environment is rarely the only thing they want. Increasingly, they look for the systems that would let a victim restore operations without paying: backup repositories, snapshot catalogs, and the administrative consoles that manage them. The ongoing SafePay ransomware campaign has become a prominent example of that approach, and it is prompting IT leaders to reexamine assumptions about how resilient their recovery plans really are.
The lesson reaches beyond any single threat group. For organizations that rely on outsourced IT operations, it raises a practical question about who is responsible for protecting the last copy of critical data, and whether the backup architecture in place would survive an attacker with administrative access.
Why Backups Have Become a Primary Target
Ransomware operators have long understood that a reliable backup undermines their leverage. Modern campaigns therefore commonly include a reconnaissance phase aimed at locating backup servers, harvesting credentials, and deleting or encrypting recovery points before the ransom demand appears. Backup systems joined to the same domain as production workloads, or reachable over the same network paths, are especially exposed.
Larry Szebeni, COO of Apex Technology Services, argues that the SafePay activity illustrates this shift clearly:
"The SafePay campaign demonstrates that recovery infrastructure itself is now a primary target. Organizations must move beyond network-connected backup models and implement offline, encrypted and immutable copies to ensure ransomware cannot compromise their last line of defense. This is becoming table stakes in any robust disaster recovery program."
— Larry Szebeni, COO, Apex Technology Services
The point is that a backup which can be reached by an attacker is not a dependable backup. Conventional replication to a connected repository, however frequent, offers little protection if stolen credentials allow an intruder to delete it.
What Offline and Immutable Actually Mean
The terms are often used loosely, so definitions matter. An offline or air-gapped copy is logically or physically disconnected from the production network, so that a compromised environment cannot reach it. An immutable copy uses write-once technology or object-lock features that prevent changes or deletion for a defined retention period, even by administrators. Encryption protects the data itself, limiting the damage if a copy is stolen as part of a double-extortion attempt.
Each control addresses a different failure mode. Isolation limits reachability, immutability limits tampering, and encryption limits exposure. Long-standing guidance such as the 3-2-1 backup rule, which calls for multiple copies on different media with one stored off-site, is increasingly being extended to include an immutable or offline copy. Equally important is regular restore testing, since an untested backup can fail at the moment it is needed.
The Market Context for Managed Recovery
Demand for outside help with these capabilities is substantial. Gartner forecast worldwide IT services spending at a notable sum in 2025, a total that includes consulting, implementation, managed services, and support. Separately, the global IT and business services market reached a notable sum in contract value in 2025, according to ISG data reported by Red9 in 2026.
Within that market, the mix is shifting. ISG forecast traditional managed-services growth of a significant share in 2026, while it expected cloud-services revenue to grow a significant share. That divergence suggests customers are steering spending toward cloud-led delivery models, which affects how backup and recovery are designed, since cloud object storage with immutability features is now a common building block.
Security outsourcing is already well established. In a 2025 survey, Barracuda found that 73% of organizations already outsourced security services to an MSP, and that 96% either used or were considering one. That figure is specific to security rather than all managed services, but it indicates that many organizations are comfortable relying on providers for protective functions. IDC and KPMG reported in 2026 that nearly 91% of organizations rely on service providers to support digital transformation, and that more than four in five executives distinguish modern managed services from traditional outsourcing (IDC).
Building Recovery Into Service Agreements
For buyers, the practical implication is that backup and disaster recovery should be treated as a defined service with measurable outcomes, not an assumed feature. Several questions are worth putting to any provider or internal team:
- Are backup copies stored in an environment with separate credentials and separate administrative controls from production?
- Is at least one copy immutable, with retention locks that cannot be shortened by a compromised account?
- Are backups encrypted in transit and at rest, with keys managed independently?
- How often are full restores tested, and against what recovery time and recovery point objectives?
Service-management frameworks can help structure these commitments. ITIL 4 provides adaptable practices for service continuity and incident management, whereas ISO/IEC 20000-1:2018 serves as the certifiable international standard for service-management systems. Neither prescribes a specific backup technology, but both encourage the documented, repeatable processes that make recovery dependable under pressure.
Multi-factor authentication on backup consoles, role separation, and monitoring for unusual deletion activity add further layers. These controls matter because attackers frequently succeed not by defeating encryption, but by logging in with valid credentials.
Looking Ahead
Ransomware groups are likely to keep adapting, and recovery infrastructure will remain a central point of contention. As cloud-led delivery grows and more organizations turn to providers for security and resilience, expectations are likely to harden: isolated, immutable, and regularly tested copies are moving from best practice toward baseline requirement. Organizations that validate their recovery posture now, before an incident forces the issue, will be better placed to restore operations on their own terms rather than their attackers'.
⬇️