Key Takeaways
- Malicious JavaScript in 188 Optimizely snippets exposed visitors to crypto theft, card skimming, cookie theft and iOS exploits.
- Restrictive Content Security Policy configurations blocked the payload at only 24 affected organizations.
- The incident shows why enterprises need to monitor the behavior and integrity of trusted third-party JavaScript.
Report URI has uncovered a large client-side supply-chain attack in which malicious JavaScript reached visitors to 178 organizations through Optimizely Web. The affected group included Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Report URI identified 188 infected Optimizely snippets after examining 1,611 distinct snippets during the incident on November 16, 2026.
The malicious code was inserted into Project JavaScript, an Optimizely Web field that lets customers add custom code to snippets distributed through Optimizely’s infrastructure. That distinction matters. The files still arrived from trusted Optimizely domains with valid certificates, and researchers noted the incident was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. How the attacker obtained write access across numerous customer projects remains unknown. Possible explanations include access to an Optimizely system or credentials with cross-customer reach, but neither scenario had been confirmed at publication.
Once executed in a visitor’s browser, the payload could replace valid cryptocurrency wallet addresses with addresses controlled by the attacker. It modified page content, form fields, links, clipboard operations and some outgoing requests. The research team had verified approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency received by attacker wallets as of 19:25 UTC. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, suggesting active development rather than a static, one-off injection.
At 13:43 UTC, the attacker added payment-card skimming. The code monitored form submissions and POST requests for card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs, then attempted to transmit matching data to attacker infrastructure. Hosted payment fields from services such as Stripe and Adyen were outside its direct reach, but card information entered into forms controlled by affected websites could have been exposed. The malware also collected accessible cookies and screenshots under certain conditions.
The mobile component raised the stakes further. On iPhones and iPads, the JavaScript routed visitors toward the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Coruna targeted iOS 13 through 17, while DarkSword targeted versions of iOS 18.x. Analysis of the exploit-kit code indicated iOS 18.7.3 and later, along with iOS 26.3 and later, were patched. Visitors using older releases could see affected pages reload every 60 seconds as the exploit retried.
Trusting the delivery domain did not mean the delivered code remained trustworthy. Traditional server monitoring at an affected organization might not show a compromise because the malicious behavior occurred inside visitors’ browsers. Script-integrity monitoring, browser policy reports and detection of new outbound destinations can provide a different view. The firm noted its Script Watch, Data Watch, Frame Watch, CSP Integrity and JS Time Machine capabilities could have highlighted the changed snippet and its unexpected behavior.
Content Security Policy offered mixed protection. An evaluation of 256 hosts associated with affected organizations found 68 had no CSP. Another 50 had policies that allowed both execution and data theft. Seventeen allowed the payload to run but blocked exfiltration through restrictive connect-src rules. Only 24 organizations, or 15%, blocked the payload.
That result reflects a broader adoption gap. The 2025 HTTP Archive Web Almanac found CSP on 21.9% of measured websites, up from 18.5% in 2024, even as HTTPS accounted for 98.8% of mobile requests. Transport encryption protects data in transit, but it does not decide which scripts may execute after a page loads.
Configuration quality matters too. Mozilla’s MDN documentation explains how directives such as script-src, connect-src and frame-src constrain browser behavior. In this incident, permissive settings including unsafe-eval, or policies that extended trust through strict-dynamic, could let parts of the attack proceed. Organizations using Optimizely Web should review Project JavaScript, rotate relevant credentials and tokens, examine potentially exposed cookies and payment data, and begin CSP deployment in report-only mode before moving carefully toward enforcement.
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